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THE SHOCKING TRUTH: LAW ENFORCEMENT'S USE AND
ABUSE OF TASERS AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
MICHELLE E. MCSTRAVICK*
I. INTRODUCTION: SMALL DEVICE MAKES BIG IMPACT
In June 2010, an eighty-six year old bedridden Oklahoma woman was
TASERed, according to police reports, for taking a "more aggressive pos-
ture in her bed" that allegedly caused the ten officers surrounding her to
fear for their lives.' The officers have been accused of assaulting the wo-
man and depriving her of oxygen when they stepped on her oxygen tank
line before TASERing her.2 On September 7, 2010, a school resource of-
ficer in Middletown, Connecticut TASERed a seventeen year old boy ac-
cused of stealing a beef patty from the school cafeteria.3 In July 2009, the
chief of police of Tucumcari, New Mexico "tased a 14 year old girl with
epilepsy as she attempted to flee" and pierced her brain when one of the
prongs went through her skull.4 These are just a few of the recent inci-
dents that have called into question the overzealous use of TASERs by law
enforcement and security personnel.5
* Villanova Law School, J.D. expected, Spring 2012. 1 would like to thank the
members of the Villanova Law Review for all of their helpful comments on this
Article as well as Jack and Joan McStravick and Ed Costa for their unending
support.
1. See Complaint at 4, Varner v. City of El Reno, No. CIV-00636-F (W.D. Okla.
filed June 21, 2010) (recounting officer's comments in official police report from
incident). The victim is bringing claims against several El Reno police officers for
being "wrongfully seized, assaulted, battered, physically harmed, humiliated, emo-
tionally harmed, . . . cruelly injured with a Taser and imprisoned for several days
without probable cause in a hospital." See id. at 1 (asserting multiple claims for
injuries sustained during TASERing incident).
2. See id. at 4 (alleging that officers shot woman twice with TASER at high
voltage, causing extreme pain, burns to her chest, and loss of consciousness).
3. See Leanne Gendreau, Cops: Tasering Teen in Stealing Beef Patty Incident
Appropriate, NBC CONN., Sept. 8, 2010, http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/
local-beat/Student-Tasered-Over-Stolen-Patty-Cops-102368909.html (reporting
TASER incident in which school resource officer TASERed teen while being es-
corted from school grounds after attempting to steal beef patty).
4. See Laura Schauer, Taser Use in Need of Regulation, SILVER CYTY SUN-NEWS
(N.M.), Aug. 24, 2010, (documenting "disturbing pattern" of both inappropriate
and excessive use of TASERs by law enforcement in state of New Mexico).
5. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, United States of America: Excessive and Lethal Force?
Amnesty International's Concerns About Deaths and Ill-treatment Involving Police Use of
Tasers, at 46-53, AI Index AMR 51/139/2004 (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://
www.amnestyusa.org/countries/usa/Taserreport.pdf (compiling case studies on
TASER abuses by law enforcement).
(363)
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Perhaps the most publicized TASER incident thus far involved the
now infamous phrase: "Don't Tase Me Bro!" 6 This catch phrase gained
instant fame in 2007 when University of Florida student Andrew Meyer was
TASERed by officers for refusing to leave aJohn Kerry speech.7 While this
quote gave Meyer his fifteen minutes of fame, it also served a much larger
purpose in American culture, bringing the discussion of TASER use by law
enforcement officers to the forefront of both political and popular
discussion.8
The first TASER device was envisioned in 1969 by a NASA Scientist,
Jack Cover, who wanted to create a device that could control unruly sus-
pects without requiring officers to resort to firearms.9 When the TASER
was finally launched in 1974, it had one primary drawback: it was pro-
pelled by gunpowder, which subjected it to regulation by the United States
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). o The ATF
6. See Tasered Student Won't Be Charged, CBS NEWS, Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/30/national/main3429866.shtml (quoting stu-
dent's last words before being TASERed by several officers at public event for re-
sisting officers' attempts to calm him down).
7. Naomi Wolf, A Shocking Moment for Society: Tasering at University of florida,
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/naomi-wolf/a-
shocking-moment-for-soc_b 64909.html (denouncing TASER usage as act of vio-
lence against Meyer and scolding American public for accepting this abuse of
force). Wolf further contests that making excuses for these types of incidents be-
cause they are not happening to "us" can have disastrous consequences, as history
makes clear. See id.
8. See, e.g., Mike Nizza, Taking Sides in a Tasing, THE LEDE: N.Y. TIMES NEWS
BLOc (Sept. 19, 2007, 9:25 AM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/09/19/
taking-sides-in-a-tasing/ (reporting on estimated 200 person rally in Florida on
September 18, 2007, to protest against TASERing of Andrew Meyer at Kerry
event); see also Asher Moses, 'Don't Tase Me, Bro!' a Global Sensation, SYDNEY MORN-
ING HER., Sept. 20, 2007, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/web/dont-
tase-me-bro/2007/09/20/1189881651002.html (declaring that "Don't Tase Me
Bro!" became instant hit worldwide with YouTube videos of incident being viewed
almost three million times).
9. See Ron F. Wright, Shocking the Second Amendment: Invalidating States' Prohibi-
tions on Taser with the District of Columbia v. Heller, 20 ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH. 159,
162-63 (2010) (using acronym TASER inspired by his favorite childhood comic
book hero Thomas A. Swift's Electric Rifle). TOM SwIFr AND His ELECTRIC RIFLE
was a fiction novel for young adults that featured a weapon that could stun or
disintegrate from a distance by shooting an electric charge. SeeJ.P. Karenko, Tom
Swift and His Electric Rifle (2005) (book review), available at http://www.tomswift.
info/homepage/erifle.html (detailing Thomas A. Swift's adventures in which Elec-
tric Rifle was used to ward off danger); see also Jerry Langdon, The Dark Lure of
"Pain Compliance", THE STAR (Toronto), Dec. 1, 2007, available at http://www.the
star.com/News/article/281499 (discussing sad reality that TASER is often used for
pain compliance or "inflicting pain to get someone to do what you want" and has
been used in many situations its inventor would never have imagined). A firearms
consultant, after having been shot with a TASER, remarked that it was "the most
profound pain I have ever felt. You get total compliance because they don't want
that pain again." See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that officers exper-
ienced extreme pain after being exposed to TASER during training).
10. See Rick Smith, CEO, TASER Int'l, History of TASER Devices (Mar. 12,
2007), http://www.taser.com/research/Science/Pages/HistoryofTASERDevices.
364
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required special permits to carry the TASER that were expensive and diffi-
cult to obtain, and limited its availability strictly to law enforcement
agents.' In addition to these restrictions, law enforcement agencies were
also hesitant to implement the technology after a failed product demon-
stration in Prague highlighted the early TASERs' inability to incapacitate
many pain-insensitive subjects that were able to fight through the shock.12
Due to these shortcomings and a general uneasiness about the ethical im-
plications of using TASERs on the public, only a limited number of
TASERs were sold to law enforcement agencies throughout the 1970s and
1980s.13
In 1993, two brothers purchased the rights to the technology and re-
vamped the design of the TASER so that it used a compressed-gas-based
propellant, instead of gunpowder, allowing it to be reclassified as a non-
firearm and freeing it from ATF restrictions.14 Since the reclassification,
aspx (explaining limitations of early TASERs and their failure to catch on as main-
stream weapons until last few decades when such design limitations were
corrected).
11. See id. (indicating difficulty in categorizing TASER-it looked like flash-
light, not gun, and "did not fit the specifications for either a pistol or a long-
gun"-so it was classified as Title 2 weapon in same class as "sawed-off" shotgun).
The National Firearms Act, which codified the group of Title 2 weapons (often
referred to as "Class 3" weapons) included firearms such as "machine guns, short-
barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns and silencers," as well as a class of weapons
called "any other weapon." See LEE ALsTON-WILLIAMS, DEP'T OF JUST., PRIVACY IM-
PACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE FIREARMS INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY (FIT) 5 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/pia/privacy-impact-assessment-
fit.pdf (failing to define specifically what kind of weapons fall within "any other
weapons" category). The ATF has explained that "any other weapons" can include
such things as H&R Handyguns, Ithaca Auto-Burglar guns, Cane guns, and
Gadget-type firearms and pen guns that fire projectiles by action of explosive. See
Frequently Asked Questions: Nat' Firearms Act (NFA)-Firearms, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND ExPLOSIvES, http://www.atf.gov/firearms/faq/national-
firearms-act-firearms.html (citing examples of "any other weapon").
12. See ELEC. CONTROL DEVICES, AN INTRODUCTION To TASER ELECTRONIC
CONTROL DEVICES, HISTORY, ELECTRICITY, ELECTRICAL STIMULATION, ELECTRICAL
MEASUREMENTS, AND THE HUMAN BODY 19-20 (2008), available at http://www.ecd
law.info/outlines/11-10-08%2OBrave%20ECD%2OAppendix%20FIN.pdf (detail-
ing chronology of TASER device technologies and difficulties in marketing early
TASER devices due to ATF restrictions).
13. See id. (discussing failure of early TASER products to meet consumer
needs).
14. See id. at 20 (documenting success of TASER when brothers Rick and Tom
Smith hired Jack Cover to design new model of TASER driven by compressed air
or nitrogen). After a traffic altercation in which two of Rick and Tom Smith's
close friends were shot and killed, the brothers realized there was a void in defense
technology that needed to be filled with a non-lethal alternative to the firearm,
which usually ended in death or serious bodily injury. See id. at 19-20 (aspiring to
create non-lethal alternative defense weapon people could turn to for protection
instead of having to use firearms); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL.,
STUN GUN FALLACY: HOW THE LACK OF TASER REGULATION ENDANGERS LIVES 3
(2005) [hereinafter ACLU REPORT], available at http://www.aclunc.org/issues/
criminal-justice/police-practices/asset upload file389_5242.pdf (declaring that
lack of regulation by ATF has left TASER International "free to market its product
2011] 365
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"Taser International has sold over 200,000 law enforcement Tasers," and
in 2008 alone, it shipped 86,068 TASERs.15
The device, which operates on twenty-six watts of electrical output
and delivers a 50,000 volt shock, works by propelling two darts up to
twenty-one feet.' 6 The shock delivered by the darts is "designed to over-
ride the subject's central nervous system causing uncontrollable contrac-
tion of the muscle tissue and instant collapse."1 7 Amnesty International
insists that these electro-shock weapons are inherently vulnerable to abuse
as they can inflict serious pain at the push of a button, without leaving
substantial marks.' 8 Amnesty International further questions the classifi-
cation of TASERs as non-lethal weapons in light of their findings that be-
tween 2001 and August 2008, 334 people in the United States died after
being struck with a TASER.19 Likewise, the United Nations stated that the
use of TASERs, "provoking extreme pain, constituted a form of torture" in
without government interference or oversight" and has led to vastly inconsistent
policies across law enforcement agencies).
15. See Wright, supra note 9, at 186-87 (acknowledging substantial increase in
TASER consumption by both law enforcement and individuals over past few de-
cades); see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 4 ("Manufacturers and law enforce-
ment agencies deploying tasers maintain that they are a safer alternative to many
conventional weapons in controlling dangerous or combative individuals.").
16. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 4 (indicating that TASERs work by em-
bedding probes in skin of suspect-allowing current to flow from device through
wires attached to suspect-and are programmed to work in five-second bursts, but
can be prolonged beyond that time if officer's finger remains on trigger).
17. Id. In addition, so long as the probes remain attached to the suspect,
shocks can be administered repeatedly. See id. at 5 (explaining that TASERs are
also equipped with "laser sights for accurate targeting ... [and] have a built in
memory option to record the date and time of each firing"). The TASER works by
interrupting the electrical signals from the "central nervous system to the periph-
eral body. This interruption overwhelms the motor nervous system and causes the
body to experience sudden shaking and rigidity, typically leading to a loss of bal-
ance and a fall to the ground." See Greg Meyer, Conducted Electrical Weapons: A
User's Perspective, in TASER CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS: PHYSIOLOGY, PATHOL-
OGY AND LAw 1-2 (Mark W. Kroll & Jeffery D. Ho eds., 2009) (describing physiolog-
ical effects of TASER on human body).
18. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 2 (addressing difficulty of victims in
seeking redress for such injuries because majority of instances leave barely visible
marks on skin and cause no lasting injuries). Specifically, using the TASER in
"touch" stun gun mode (applying it directly to the skin) is designed for "pain com-
pliance" and is often used against individuals who are already in custody or under
police control. See id. at 67 (emphasizing that while "Tasers are widely promoted
by U.S. police agencies as being a useful force tool, safer than many other weapons
.... In practice, however, they are commonly used to subdue individuals who do
not pose a serious and immediate threat to the lives or safety of others").
19. See TASERs-Potentially Lethal and Easy to Abuse, AMNESTY INT'L, Dec. 16,
2008, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/tasers-potentially-
lethal-and-easy-abuse-20081216 (detailing statistics from Amnesty International
study which found that of ninety-eight autopsies done, "90 per cent of those who
died after being struck with a Taser were unarmed and many did not appear to
present a serious threat").
366 [Vol. 56: p. 363
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violation of international law and had a "proven risk of harm or death."2 0
In response, TASER International points out that a medical study from
October 2007 concluded that 99.7% of 962 subjects had no injuries or
only mild injuries after being shocked with a TASER, and insists that
TASERs are safer than the alternative-lethal force. 2 1
While there is lively debate about the appropriateness and propor-
tionality of law enforcement's use of TASERs to apprehend suspects, the
lower courts have struggled, without much guidance, to strike a balance
between the needs of law enforcement and the rights of the individual.2 2
Most of the claims that arise involving the use of TASERs by law enforce-
ment officers are brought by victims as excessive force claims.23
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held that when law en-
forcement uses excessive force to effectuate an investigatory stop, arrest,
or other seizure of the person, such claims are "properly analyzed under
20. See U.N.: Tasers Are a Form of Torture, CBS NEWS, Nov. 25, 2007, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/25/national/main3537803.shtml (reporting
that after six TASER-related deaths in one week people rallied demanding stun
guns be banned). Again in May 2010, the United Nations reiterated its concern
over the use of stun guns specifically when used to restrain persons already in
custody which it concluded is a violation of the Convention Against Torture. See
Press Release, Comm. Against Torture, Comm. Against Torture Concludes Forty-
Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. CAT10/021E (May 14, 2010), available at http://www.
unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear-en)/539D76CD77AEE766C125
772300342DBB?OpenDocument (analyzing different TASER policies of interna-
tional community that violate Convention Against Torture).
21. See Matthew J. Spriggs, Note, "Don't Tase Me Bro!": An Argument for Clear
and Effective Taser Regulation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 487, 493 (2009) (implying that of-
ficers would have resorted to firearms in many situations where TASERs have in-
stead been used). But see ACLU REPORT, supra note 14, at 6 (arguing that while
TASER International continues to push TASERs as safer alternative to lethal force,
they are most often used in situations in which "officers would never-and could
never-use a gun").
22. See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence justified?, 102 Nw. U.L. REv.
1119, 1139 (2008) (recognizing marked confusion among lower courts in wake of
last Supreme Court case to discuss excessive force claims and standards, Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)). This marked confusion is attributable to the Court's
failure to determine which of the Graham factors is most significant and how courts
should guide their analysis, further muddling the excessive force framework. See
id. (concluding that Court further obscured reasonableness test for excessive
force).
23. See Jeff Fabian, Note, Don't Tase Me Bro!: A Comprehensive Analysis of the
Laws Governing Taser Use by Law Enforcement, 62 FLA. L. REv. 763, 768 (2010) (de-
claring that law governing officers' use of force is vague, which "allows courts to
grant law enforcement officers a great deal of latitude when deciding how much
and what type of force to use"). Despite this lack of specificity, courts have gener-
ally determined force to be excessive when it was "unreasonable or unnecessary ...
under the circumstances." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 294 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
Reasonable force is that force which is "necessary to achieve a legal goal," whereas
excessive force is force "disproportionate to what is necessary to achieve a legal
goal." See Charlie Mesloh et al., Conducted Electrical Weapons and Resolution of Use-of-
Force Encounters, in TASER CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONs, supra note 17, at 23,
24 (differentiating between excessive force and reasonable force).
3672011]1
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the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard."24 While
victims of excessive force are often successful in winning settlements,
plaintiffs still face a major hurdle when bringing such claims, as officers
often assert a qualified immunity defense. 25 Plaintiffs that can overcome a
qualified immunity defense face yet another major obstacle: the objective
reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment, which considers the of-
ficers' point of view, and not their subjective intent, to decide whether
their use of the TASER was reasonable.2 6 Although TASERs have been
around since the 1970s, they have surged in popularity over the last ten
years with over 5,000 law enforcement agencies employing the TASER, but
most without individual TASER policies to guide officers in the field. 27
24. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (ruling that claims
brought under § 1983 are meant to be addressed under specific constitutional
guarantee, such as Fourth Amendment guarantee to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, rather than single generic standard, and ruling that § 1983
was not meant to be "source of substantive rights" as guaranteed under Fourteenth
Amendment).
25. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 29-35 (reporting $675,000 settle-
ment paid by City of Chula Vista, California after officer shot pregnant woman in
her back causing her to fall belly-first onto concrete, causing fetal demise twelve
hours later). A $145,000 settlement was paid by the City of Portland, Oregon to a
seventy-one-year-old blind and deaf woman who was TASERed by officers three
times-including once in the head, which caused her prosthetic eye to become
dislodged from its socket-all because she failed to follow orders not to enter a
trailer where her things were being kept. See id. (pointing out that Portland Police
Department altered its policies shortly after this incident, "imposing restrictions on
use of the Taser in the case of vulnerable people such as the elderly, children and
pregnant women"). For a discussion of why defendants are often reluctant to set-
tle, see infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
26. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 771 (discussing uncertainty of reasonableness
inquiry, where officers can violate individual's Fourth Amendment rights by using
excessive force and nonetheless be "immune from suit if the officers made a rea-
sonable mistake as to what the law requires"). For a further discussion on the
difficulty a plaintiff faces in bringing an excessive force claim due to the qualified
immunity defense, see infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
27. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 1 (arguing that use of TASERs should be
put on hold until independent study properly addresses health and safety con-
cerns). There have been a growing number of fatalities related to TASER usage in
recent years, specifically when used against "people who are agitated or under the
influence of drugs, or have underlying health problems." See id. (urging that inde-
pendent studies are necessary to understand true medical risks of TASER devices
because doctors are often hesitant to make conclusions about TASER-related fatali-
ties as little is known medically about their effects). In April 2005, the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police issued a report on TASER technology urging
police departments to reconsider their TASER policies and indicating that "inde-
pendent data does not yet exist concerning in-custody deaths, the safety of
[Electro-Muscular Disruption Technology] when applied to drug or alcohol-com-
prised individuals, or other critical issues." See INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE,
ELECTRO-MUSCULAR DISRUPTION TECHNOLOGY. A NINE-STEP STRATEGY FOR EFFEC-
TrVE DEPLOYMENT 5 (2005) [hereinafter IACP REPORT], available at http://www.
theiacp.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JK7o%2b4Ai2hE%3d&tabid=87 (highlight-
ing void in independent TASER data and addressing health implications of using
TASER on body).
368
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The lack of clear guidance by law enforcement agencies coupled with the
limited guidance of states has led to vastly inconsistent results across the
different circuits. 28
This Note discusses the current state of TASER usage by law enforce-
ment, specifically the lack of uniform guidelines to instruct officers when
TASER use is appropriate, and it makes recommendations for clarity and
reform.29 Part II of this Note explains the difficulty that victims of TASER
abuse face in bringing excessive force claims and the role of qualified im-
munity.3 0 Part III addresses the challenges arising from the multi-factor
balancing test set out by the Supreme Court.31 Further, it highlights the
untapped potential of state regulation to fill the void in TASER regula-
tion.3 2 Part IV details the use-of-force continuum relied upon by law en-
forcement agencies in deciding when a particular use of force is
warranted, and compares United States TASER policies with international
standards.3 3 Lastly, Part V recommends stricter regulations that would still
allow officers to use TASERs, but would provide a clear and consistent
policy for deciding when such use is appropriate.3 4
28. See Spriggs, supra note 21, at 497 (indicating that "only a few states have
laws that specifically cover law enforcements use of tasers" and those that do only
require a limited amount of TASER training before they are issued to officers).
The United States Government Accountability Office conducted a study from late
2004 through mid-2005 of seven law enforcement agencies that had "purchased
and used the largest number of Tasers for the longest period of time" and found
that none of seven agencies had specific use-of-force policies for TASERs gov-
erning when such usage is appropriate. See U.S. Gov'T AccOUNTABILIlY OFFICE,
REPORT No. GAO-05-464, TASER WEAPONS: USE OF TASERS BY SELECTED ENFORCE-
MENT AGENCIES 2, 11-12 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d05464.pdf (observing and reporting on TASER proto-
cols in several law enforcement agencies and concluding that "as the Taser be-
comes more widely available for use . . . training is critical to help ensure its safe,
effective and appropriate use"). Moreover, each agency required on average only
four to eight hours of TASER training as compared to sixty to one hundred hours
required for firearms. See id. at 11-12.
29. For a list of proposed recommendations to alleviate the confusion in cur-
rent TASER regulation, see infra notes 170-97 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of excessive force claims and an analysis of the qualified
immunity defense arguing that excessive force claims often fail because of wide
discretion granted to officers in their use of force, see infra notes 35-64 and accom-
panying text.
31. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's multi-factor balancing test for
excessive force and the struggle of lower courts and officers in applying this test,
see infra notes 68-116 and accompanying text.
32. For a detailed discussion on the current lack of state law to guide law
enforcement policies and the need for states to take a look at their current or non-
existent TASER policies and adopt specific regulations, see infra notes 117-26 and
accompanying text.
33. For an analysis of the pros and cons of the use-of-force continuum, which
guides many law enforcement agencies' use-of-force policies, as well as a discussion
of international TASER policies, see infra notes 130-69 and accompanying text.
34. For a synopsis of regulations and recommendations that various sources
have promoted for TASER usage, see infra notes 170-97 and accompanying text.
2011] 369
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II. REASONABLE OR EXCESSIVE FORCE? TOEING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT LINE
A. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claims
Most often, excessive force claims arise as federal civil suits under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.35 Section 1983 "gives a cause of action to someone who has
been deprived of his or her constitutional rights by someone acting under
the color of law."3 6 For example, when an officer pulls over a car for
speeding, he has, for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, effectively
seized the car and all of its passengers.3 7 Thereafter, any force used by the
officer in effectuating the stop can become subject to civil penalty under
Section 1983 if the suspect can prove that the officer employed more force
than necessary in making the stop.3 8
While excessive force claims can arise anytime an officer or govern-
ment official uses more force than is necessary to effectuate a seizure, this
Note will focus specifically on investigatory stops, arrests, and similar
seizures that occur prior to an individual being formally indicted and
charged with a crime.39 These claims are properly analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment. 40 Claims brought by incarcerated individuals are an-
alyzed separately under the Eighth Amendment ban against "cruel and
35. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 768 (specifying normal procedure for exces-
sive force claims).
36. See id. (denoting purpose of § 1983 to provide civil remedy where, specifi-
cally in relation to TASERs, individuals can bring claims for excessive force which
deprived them of their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable re-
straint). Section 1983 provides in relevant part that:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
37. See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007) (holding that passen-
gers as well as drivers are "seized" for duration of traffic stop under Fourth
Amendment).
38. See, e.g., Bryan v. MacPherson, 608 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2010) (alleg-
ing excessive force when suspect was pulled over for speeding and shot with
TASER without warning, when suspect was neither threatening officer nor even
facing him at time TASER was used).
39. See Lawrence J. Brennan, A Simulation of Direct and Cross-Examination of an
Expert Witness in an Excessive Force Case Followed by a Discussion Analyzing Its Legal and
Strategic Aspects, 512 PLI/LiT 153, 170 (1995) (indicating that when excessive force
claims arise in context of investigatory stop, arrest, or similar seizure, they are most
properly characterized as "invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment,
which guarantees the right 'to be secure in their persons . .. against unreasonable
... seizures' of the person").
40. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (ruling that when suspect
brings claim for excessive force in course of investigatory stop, arrest, or similar
seizure, "such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment").
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unusual punishment."4 1 While these claims are equally serious, this Note
seeks to offer recommendations that will guide officers in the field and
limit the number of excessive force claims. 42
To succeed in an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amend-
ment, a "plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he suffered a significant in-
jury; (2) resulting directly and only from the use of force that was clearly
excessive to the need; and (3) the force used was objectively unreasona-
ble."43 While the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed how
and when TASER usage may be deemed excessive force, it has elaborated
on excessive force in several other contexts.4 4 In Tennessee v. Garner,45 the
Court held that using deadly force against a fleeing felon who is unarmed
and does not pose a significant threat of death or serious injury to an
officer or others is excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. 4 6 The
amount of force used by a suspect or the threat the suspect posed to of-
ficers were the most significant factors in the Court's analysis when decid-
ing whether an officer's corresponding show of force was proportional or
excessive.47
41. See J. Michael McGuinness, A Pimer on North Carolina and Federal Use of
Force Law: Trends in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, Qualified Immunity, and State Law
Issues, 31 CAMPBELL L. REv. 431, 446 (2009) (providing that "where excessive force
is used against a convicted prisoner, the claim is analyzed under the Eighth
Amendment to determine whether cruel and unusual punishment has been ap-
plied"); see also Fabian, supra note 23, at 768 (explaining that "the particular consti-
tutional provision enforced depends on the context in which the alleged excessive
force occurred").
42. For a list of recommendations for proper TASER usage that could be im-
plemented to guide officers in the field and limit excessive force claims, see infra
notes 170-97 and accompanying text.
43. See Autin v. City of Baytown, 174 F. App'x 183, 185 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing
Fontenot v. Cormier, 56 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 1995)) (establishing three-prong
test for plaintiffs to meet their burden for establishing excessive force claim under
Fourth Amendment and emphasizing that officers' point of view is to be consid-
ered when evaluating reasonableness of their actions). The Court has made clear
that "'not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace
of a judge's chambers,' violates the Fourth Amendment." See Graham, 490 U.S. at
396 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)) (defining line
between actionable and non-actionable conduct under Fourth Amendment).
44. For a discussion of Supreme Court precedent on the subject of excessive
force under the Fourth Amendment, see infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
45. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
46. See id. at 11-12 (failing to specifically state whether all excessive force
claims arising from apprehension of suspect were to be analyzed under Fourth
Amendment).
47. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 773 (noting that Supreme Court emphasized
"non-dangerous nature of the suspect" and hinted that showing of deadly force
may have been justified in Garner had suspect made threat of force to officers or
"committed a crime with the potential to inflict serious harm"). Other factors that
were considered by the Court in determining whether the suspect posed a threat
included: the "suspect's age and physical characteristics; the severity of the under-
lying crime; and whether the suspect was armed." Id.
2011] 371
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Four years later, in Graham v. Connor,48 the Court addressed another
excessive force claim and adopted much of its analysis in Garner, laying out
a three-part test to guide lower courts when deciding whether a particular
use of force was excessive. 49 The Court noted that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires a case-by-case analysis, taking into consideration: "(1) the
severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."50 While this frame-
work to establish a claim for excessive force may seem rather straightfor-
ward, plaintiffs must often first overcome the qualified immunity defense
in order to have their cases decided on the merits. 5 '
B. How Qualified Is "Qualified Immunity "?
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that government ac-
tors are entitled to some form of immunity from civil suits for damages.5 2
The policy rationale behind the qualified immunity defense is that "public
officers require this protection to shield them from undue interference
48. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
49. See id. at 397 (making clear that pre-arrest claims of excessive force are to
be analyzed under Fourth Amendment from prospective of reasonable officer on
scene, affirming its reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)). While the
Graham test provides a "general standard for the efficacy of police behavior," one
scholar has posited that it continues to "fail to provide specific criteria that officers
may use when deciding whether and how much force should be applied." See Mes-
loh et al., supra note 23, at 25-26 (denouncing Graham test for lack of clarity and
guidance to officers and courts).
50. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (emphasizing that test for excessive force is
"reasonableness" and courts must consider "totality of the circumstances" in addi-
tion to factors determined significant by Court). Circuit courts have reasoned that
the Supreme Court did not intend to limit the reasonableness inquiry to these
three factors. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (insist-
ing that "'[b]ecause the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is
not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,' the reasonableness of
a seizure must instead be assessed by carefully considering the objective facts and
circumstances that confronted the arresting officer" (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at
396)). For a discussion of other factors lower courts have found to be determina-
tive in their reasonableness analysis, see infra note 113 and accompanying text.
51. See generally Fabian, supra note 23, at 770-71 (explaining challenges faced
by plaintiffs bringing excessive force claims). For a more detailed analysis of the
difficulty of overcoming a qualified immunity defense, see infra notes 52-64 and
accompanying text.
52. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (reasoning that if public
officials feared lawsuits every time they made discretionary decisions they may hesi-
tate to act when we need them to and some individuals may be deterred from
taking up public service). One scholar has noted, however, that the fear of lawsuit
does not "appear to wield the extraordinary power imagined by the court" in its
justification for qualified immunity. Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of
Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decision Making, 57 UCLA L. REv.
1023, 1078 (2010) (insisting that lawsuits against law enforcement have generally
carried no financial or workplace ramifications, and courts' fear that by holding
them accountable for discretionary decisions will cause them to hesitate to act is
overstated and overemphasized).
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with their duties."5 3 The qualified immunity defense, however, severely
limits plaintiffs' opportunity to have their claims decided on the merits
because the defense is exceptionally difficult to overcome.5 4 As discussed
below, the lack of clear regulations on TASERs and the nature of the qual-
ified immunity inquiry result in such deference that courts will often find
in favor of an officer's use of force even where its necessity is
questionable.5 5
First, the test for qualified immunity laid out by the Court requires a
two-part inquiry: "(1) whether a constitutional right would have been vio-
lated on the facts alleged; and (2) whether the right was clearly estab-
lished."56 Because the case law and regulations governing TASER use are
vague or non-existent, courts are often hesitant to find that the right was
clearly established and that a reasonable officer should have known his
conduct was unconstitutional.57
Second, even if a court determines that a constitutional right was vio-
lated this does not mean a plaintiff will win the case on the merits.5 8 Qual-
53. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (discussing two types of immunity from suit-
qualified and absolute-and noting that most executive officials are entitled to
only qualified immunity depending on complexity of decision-making).
54. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REv. 809, 846 (2010) (de-
bating propriety of qualified immunity, which courts have embraced as "a neces-
sary means of protecting government officials from abusive litigation" but which
critics "argue ... prevents valid claims from being adjudicated on the merits").
55. For a discussion of qualified immunity and the lenience granted to of-
ficers in the field, see supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
56. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (granting courts discre-
tion to decide which prong should be addressed first given particular circum-
stances at hand, and overturning requirement that two-part test be decided in
order as required by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001)).
57. See, e.g., Bryan v. MacPherson, 608 F.3d. 614, 629 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding
that while Bryan's constitutional rights were violated when officer used his TASER
in dart mode when Bryan was neither resisting arrest nor attempting to flee, officer
was nonetheless granted qualified immunity because court found there was no Su-
preme Court nor Ninth Circuit case law that clearly established that officer's con-
duct was outside bounds of Fourth Amendment); Chaney v. City of Orlando, 291
F. App'x 238, 244 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding there was no clearly established law
that officer's pulling suspect out of his car, throwing him down on pavement,
handcuffing him, using his TASER on suspect's back, and putting his foot on sus-
pect's head "was so obviously wrong that [the officer] would have known it was
unlawful"); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1044 (6th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that while "plaintiffs' allegations may raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the use of the Taser was reasonable, plaintiffs have failed to show that
clearly established law at the time of the incident declared such actions unconstitu-
tional" or that reasonable officer would have known his conduct violated constitu-
tional law).
58. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528-29 (1985) (insisting that ques-
tions of qualified immunity are distinct from merits of plaintiffs claim that his
rights have been violated even though plaintiffs factual allegations may be consid-
ered in granting or denying qualified immunity). If a court determines that a
government official violated a plaintiff's rights then qualified immunity may not be
granted, but a "final determination on the merits of whether the plaintiff's rights
2011] 373
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ified immunity, which attempts to alleviate a public official from the
burdens of trial, is "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability."59 For this reason, qualified immunity is normally asserted in a
motion for summary judgment whereby the reviewing court must view the
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.6 0 Thus, a court's ruling
that a constitutional violation has occurred is not a final determination by
the fact finder; at trial, defendants can still win if plaintiffs fail to prove
their version of the facts.6 1
Lastly, even if a district court denies a request for qualified immunity,
the decision is immediately appealable. 62 The government will almost al-
ways appeal a denial of qualified immunity, making it commonplace for
appellate courts to ultimately determine that issue.63 These mechanisms
are designed to give officers plenty of opportunity to assert a strong quali-
were violated would still be left to the fact finder." See Fabian, supra note 23, at 770
(explaining that not only must plaintiffs overcome qualified immunity hurdle but
even if they succeed they must still sufficiently prove their claim at trial in order to
win their claim overall).
59. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (stating Court's belief
that "the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial-distraction of
officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and
deterrence of able people from public service"-are sufficient reasons for qualified
immunity).
60. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 771 (discussing rationale behind asserting
qualified immunity in motion for summary judgment to attempt to avoid going to
trial at all on plaintiffs claims and not having to be subjected to rigors of trial
process).
61. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528 (indicating court's policy preference that pub-
lic officials be given every benefit of doubt to refute claims made in reference to
their discretionary decisions, emphasizing significant costs if such claims were eas-
ily litigated by plaintiffs).
62. See id. at 526-27 (holding that claim of qualified immunity satisfies two-
prong test for being immediately appealable, because it (1) conclusively deter-
mines disputed question and (2) involves "[claim] of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action"). The Court found significant that once
a claim for qualified immunity is denied, the defendant has no other option but to
proceed on with a trial that may be costly and still ultimately result in defendant's
favor. See id. at 527 (requiring defendant-officers to have another mechanism at
their disposal to ensure they are not required to go to trial on erroneous excessive
force claims).
63. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 770 ("[D]istrict court's order denying quali-
fied immunity is immediately appealable. Thus, it is common for an appeals court
to decide questions of qualified immunity."). For example, each circuit case men-
tioned in this Note is an appeal from a grant or denial of qualified immunity on a
motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Cook v. City of Bella Villa, 582 F.3d 840,
844 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting procedural challenge by plaintiff of district court's
grant of summary judgment to defendant on Fourth Amendment excessive force
claims); Autin v. City of Baytown, 174 F. App'x 183, 183 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting
procedural challenge by defendant of district court's denial of summary judgment
for excessive force claim).
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fied immunity defense, severely limiting a plaintiffs opportunity to have
his or her day in court.6 4
III. LACK OF GUIDANCE: COURTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
ATTEMPTING TO STRIKE A BALANCE
As it stands, the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed
TASERs, leading the lower courts to rely on the test laid out in Graham v.
Connor when deciding whether use of a TASER was excessive.6 5 Part III.A
will detail the vastly inconsistent results arising from the lower courts' ap-
plication of Graham, and Part III.B will discuss the difficulty officers have
applying the multi-factor Graham test in the field.66 Lastly, Part III.C will
encourage state regulation of TASERs as an effective route to eliminate
some of the inconsistencies caused by Graham-at least at the state level-
by creating uniformity across state law enforcement agencies.6 7
A. Applying Supreme Court Precedent
While lower courts have consistently decided that the Graham test
should be applied to TASER cases, the results of their applications have
been inconsistent.6 8 Because the Graham test involves balancing a multi-
tude of factors in each case, it has failed to provide courts with a "system-
atic conceptual framework for assessing police uses of force," leaving lower
courts to emphasize different factors depending on the circumstances. 69
The analysis of the Graham factors below will highlight the inconsistent
results that have arisen as lower courts continue to rely on Graham to assess
excessive force claims. 70
64. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 772 (indicating strong argument for courts to
decide qualified immunity test sequentially by first deciding whether officer has
violated Constitution because then plaintiffs will have their day in court).
65. See id. at 774 (pointing out that while lower courts have largely embraced
Graham test, many scholars are markedly dissatisfied with it). One scholar's dissat-
isfaction arises from the lack of clear guidance it provides for both courts and law
enforcement. See Harmon, supra note 22, at 1129-30 (arguing that Graham fails to
guide courts on which government interests justify force and where those interests
should be placed in reference to different levels of force available).
66. For a discussion of the Graham test application by courts and officers, see
infra notes 68-116 and accompanying text.
67. For a discussion of current state TASER regulations, see infra notes 117-26
and accompanying text.
68. For a discussion addressing the inconsistencies across the lower courts in
their application of Graham to excessive force situations, see infra notes 69-92 and
accompanying text.
69. See Harmon, supra note 22, at 1127-30 (criticizing Graham test for failing to
answer most basic questions about use of force by police: "when a police officer
may use force against a citizen, how much force he may use, and what kinds of
force are permissible"). For a discussion on other key factors lower courts have
found persuasive in excessive force cases, see infra note 113 and accompanying
text.
70. For a discussion of the application of Graham by lower courts, see infra
notes 68-92 and accompanying text.
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1. Severity of the Underlying Crime at Issue
In many cases, the underlying crime at issue may be entirely irrelevant
in determining the reasonableness of the use of force applied in the situa-
tion. 7  While the underlying crime may be minimal, the perceived threat
to the officer on the scene may be high.7 2 For example, where an officer
has pulled over a car for speeding but is outnumbered, at night, with ac-
tively resisting individuals, the threat may be quite high even though
speeding is a minor offense.7 3 Vice versa, while the underlying crime may
be more severe, the threat to the officer may be minimal.7 4 This is the
case, for example, where the officer has already restrained the individ-
ual.7 5 For these reasons, lower courts have often referenced the underly-
ing crime but have rarely found it determinative.7 6
71. See Harmon, supra note 22, at 1130 (arguing that Graham "requires courts
to consider the severity of the underlying crime in all cases," which is "sometimes
irrelevant and misleading in determining whether force is reasonable"); see, e.g.,
Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App'x 791, 792-95 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that un-
derlying crime of speeding was irrelevant to determining whether use of force was
required when suspect allegedly became belligerent behind vehicle-posing threat
to safety of other drivers and himself by being so close to road).
72. See, e.g., Cook v. City of Bella Villa, 582 F.3d 840, 849 (8th Cir. 2009) (un-
derlying offense of failure to maintain single lane and driving under influence,
while minimal, did not preclude court from finding that use of TASER was reason-
able where officer was "alone and outnumbered by presumably intoxicated sus-
pects," three of whom were actively resisting officer's attempts to control
situation).
73. See id. (highlighting how underlying offense can be immaterial to actual
or perceived threat by officer on scene).
74. See, e.g., Campos v. City of Glendale, No. 06-610, 2007 WL 4468722, at *3
(D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2007) (noting that even though underlying offense of unlawful
gunfire "warranted extreme caution on the part of the officers," suspect was passed
out, lying face down on his bed, surrounded by officers, partially handcuffed, and
only passively resisting arrest by failing to respond to orders).
75. See id. (finding officers' use of force reasonable because underlying of-
fense warranted extreme caution, despite fact that situation was clearly under con-
trol and suspect was passed out and surrounded by officers).
76. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 (2007) (noting that both district
court and appellate court had determined use of force to be unreasonable since
underlying offense was only speeding-which was reversed by Supreme Court).
The Court never specifically stated that the underlying crime was irrelevant, but
instead relied on the threat posed to the officer and others and the culpability of
the suspect. See id. at 383-84 (refusing to find underlying crime determinative).
Since Scott v. Harris, one scholar has argued that the Court has further muddled
the Graham factors to be considered in excessive force claims by "deemphasiz[ing],
if not eliminat[ing], any significant instruction to lower courts facing future cases
about what to consider in evaluating police violence[] and remain[ing] near si-
lent about how to balance the interests of officers, suspects and others." See Har-
mon, supra note 22, at 1139 (voicing disapproval of Court's reasoning in Scott v.
Harris, which continues to confuse rather than guide excessive force inquiries).
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2. Whether the Suspect Poses an Immediate Threat to Officers or Others
The threat a suspect poses to officers or others is largely defined by a
reasonable officer's perception of the scene.7 7 Courts have often granted
deference to officers under this factor, condoning an officer's use of force
even where it is questionable if the suspect actually posed an immediate
threat to the officer or others.7 8 In Buckley v. Haddock,7 9 the police pulled
over a homeless man for speeding, whereafter the man became distraught
over receiving a ticket, which he refused to sign.8 0 After being placed
under arrest and walked to the police vehicle, Buckley dropped to the
ground and began to sob hysterically.8' When he refused to get up he was
TASERed three times. 82 The court upheld the TASERing as reasonable
77. See McGuinness, supra note 41, at 484-85 (stating relevant inquiry in exces-
sive force claims is based on objective reasonableness standard where "question is
whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have concluded that
a threat existed justifying the particular use of force"). The Court has made clear
that when reviewing actions of an officer on the scene they "may not employ 'the
20/20 vision of hindsight' and must make 'allowance for the fact that police of-
ficers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."' See id. at 486 (quoting Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989)) (directing courts' focus to "the circumstances at the moment
the force was used" and giving officers benefit of doubt where reflection is not
possible prior to acting).
78. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Martins Ferry, 554 F. Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. Ohio
2008) (holding that use of TASER on eighty-two-year-old man, guilty of urinating
in public, was reasonable because officer could not just let man walk away and
ignore complaint that he had urinated in public simply because he was advanced
in age and had deteriorated mental state); Johnson v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F.
Supp. 2d 467 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding use of TASER on fourteen-year-old ninth
grader reasonable under Fourth Amendment where he was actively resisting arrest
despite being handcuffed and surrounded by four officers); Nico Hines, Andrew
Meyer, the Student Who Begged: 'Don't Tase Me Bro!', Becomes Internet Star, TIMEs ON-
LINE (London), Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
us andamericas/article2489183.ece (reporting that while Andrew Meyer refused
to leave John Kerry event quietly, John Kerry remarked that he could have dealt
with Meyer himself and answered his questions without need for TASERing of
student).
79. 292 F. App'x 791 (11th Cir. 2008).
80. See id. at 792 (noting that signing of traffic citation is required by law and
officer warned p'aintiff twice that he would be arrested if he failed to sign).
81. See id. (indicating that plaintiff did not resist being handcuffed, volunta-
rily got out of his vehicle, and his only resistance consisted of his dropping to
ground, hysterically crying, and stating "my life would be better if I was dead").
82. See id. (emphasizing that officer first attempted to lift plaintiff to his feet
and then gave both warning and time for plaintiff to comply with warning each
time before TASERing suspect). Whether an officer warned the suspect before
discharging his TASER is often a factor weighed in a court's excessive force bal-
ance. See, e.g., Bryan v. MacPherson, 608 F.3d. 614, 627 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding
that force was unreasonable, underscoring that officer failed to give warning
before using TASER on suspect). The court reasoned that "police officers nor-
mally provide such warnings where feasible, even when the force is less than
deadly, and that the failure to give such a warning is a factor to consider." Id.
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on the theory that Buckley posed a threat to other drivers, the officer, and
himself because the incident occurred close to the side of the road.13
One scholar questioned whether Buckley actually posed any threat, as
it was late at night, the officer and the suspect maintained a safe distance
from the highway at all times, and they were in an area the officer himself
described as "desolate."84 While Buckley may have been uncooperative,
one can seriously doubt that he was a threat to the officer or that the
officer perceived him as a threat.8 5 The officer made several trips to the
police cruiser to report the status of the situation, leaving Buckley unat-
tended for extended periods of time.8 6 The officer would not have left
Buckley unattended for such long absences if he felt threatened or feared
that Buckley would flee.8 7
3. Whether the Suspect Is Actively Resisting Arrest or Attempting to Evade
Arrest by Flight
Cases often hinge on this factor: if a suspect is actively resisting an
officer's attempts to restrain him, the officer's use of force is granted wide
83. See Buckley, 292 F. App'x at 802 (Martin, J., dissenting) (disagreeing vehe-
mently on this point, District Judge Martin points out that Buckley's only move-
ment on ground was when TASER was applied to him, at which point he moved
further away from road-not closer to it-and at no point in time were officer and
suspect any closer to highway than they were when suspect was first pulled over on
highway). Chief Judge Edmondson's holding that Buckley posed a threat to the
officers and other drivers seems to be based on his flawed belief that Buckley
"'could both kick and run' because his legs were not restrained and 'was moving
around on the ground alongside a busy road."' See id. at 799, 802 n.5 (citation
omitted) (disputing majority's justification by pointing to video evidence). Judge
Martin indicated that both the video and officer testimony refutes Chief Judge
Edmondson's understanding. See id. at 799 (noting evidence that Buckley was in
no condition to run and made no movement to do so even when left alone by
officer as well as officer testimony that road was "'desolate"' and "'out in the mid-
dle of no where'" (footnotes omitted)).
84. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 783-84 (emphasizing those factors high-
lighted by dissent in Buckley and concluding officer's use of TASER in situation did
not "serve the government's interest in effective law enforcement"). The officer's
interest in that case was getting the plaintiff into the police cruiser, which could
not be accomplished through the use of a TASER because it incapacitated the
suspect, making him "temporarily unable to comply with an officer's demands."
See id. (remarking that "successive Taser shocks may actually frustrate an officer's
attempt to secure suspect compliance").
85. See id. at 784-85 (commenting that officer's "safer, non-violent alternative
was to call for backup").
86. See id. at 784 (pointing out that court's analysis is questionable as to
whether Buckley posed threat to anyone involved as officer described road as
"'desolate"' and "'out in the middle of no where'" (footnotes omitted)). Moreo-
ver, TASERing Buckley did not serve the government's interest in effective law
enforcement because it did not resolve the problem of getting Buckley into the
police cruiser. See id. (criticizing court's holding).
87. See id. at 784-85 (questioning whether officer's use of TASER on Buckley
was warranted).
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discretion and generally upheld.88 In Edwards v. City of Martins Ferry," a
district court upheld an officer's use of a TASER on an eighty-two year old
man with Alzheimer's disease "because the man continued to struggle af-
ter the officer pinned him down on the hood of a police car."90 Another
court upheld the TASERing of a fourteen-year-old who was handcuffed
and surrounded by four officers because he was violently resisting arrest by
kicking, punching, and biting officers.9 1 One scholar has pointed out that
while these individuals were both vulnerable-one suffered from
Alzheimer's disease and the other was a minor-and already restrained,
active resistance was enough to outweigh these considerations.9 2
B. What Does Graham Mean for Officers?
While lower courts have consistently relied on Graham to guide their
analyses, the Graham test has done little to guide officers in the field.93
Indeed Graham has articulated several factors an officer must consider
when deciding what level of force is appropriate, but it fails to provide a
practical standard for officers to rely on in conducting their duties.9 4 It is
unlikely that an officer faced with a tense situation will have the time to
perform a balancing test of multiple situational factors and make a well-
founded conclusion when even courts have difficulty doing this without
the added pressure of time and danger.96
The balancing test contains two sources of inherent uncertainty that
make it difficult for officers in the field to evaluate the reasonableness of a
certain use of force.96 As one scholar has explained, "the first source of
uncertainty stems from the fact-sensitive nature of the test: Reasonable in-
88. See id. at 788 ("[A]ctive resistance will almost always justify Tasering a sus-
pect-even when the suspect is already restrained, poses a minimal threat, or when
the suspect is from a vulnerable class of persons.").
89. 554 F. Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
90. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 779 (illustrating that "active resistance by the
arrestee weighs heavily in the officer's favor," often resulting in grant of qualified
immunity to officer even where force was used on vulnerable individual).
91. See id. at 780 (pointing out Edwards court's view that active resistance by
arrestee was reasonable justification for TASERing despite vulnerability of
suspect).
92. See id. at 781 (concluding that "active resistance weighs heavily in the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis").
93. See Harmon, supra note 22, at 1129-30 (arguing that Graham gives officers
in field "little instruction on how to weigh relevant factors").
94. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 774-75 ("Ideally, a test for evaluating the rea-
sonableness of a particular use of force would provide officers guidance without
having to wait for courts to decide whether a course of action is constitutional.").
95. See id. (pointing out impracticality of expecting officers in field facing
danger and rapidly evolving situations to perform balancing test prior to resorting
to course of action).
96. See id. at 775 (fleshing out uncertainties of balancing test and its inability
to provide needed guidance to officers in field).
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dividuals may interpret the same set of facts differently, leading to differ-
ent conclusions about whether a particular use of force was reasonable."9 7
For example, in Cook v. City of Bella Villa,98 an officer pulled over a
vehicle for allegedly crossing over the double yellow line several times.9 9
When the driver refused a sobriety test the officer allegedly slammed her
against the hood of the car in an attempt to handcuff her, and in the
process began touching her inappropriately. 0 0 Her husband, one of
three passengers in the car, then got out and yelled at the officer who in
turn replied: "I'll talk to you in a minute."'o' As the officer was attempting
to move the woman towards his police cruiser, the husband stepped to-
wards the officer, and in that instant the officer shot the husband with his
TASER.102
In concluding that the officer's use of the TASER was reasonable, the
majority emphasized that the officer was responding to a "rapidly escalat-
ing situation" when he used the TASER, because it was after midnight and
he was outnumbered by three non-complying individuals when the hus-
band came towards him.'0 3 The dissent, however, in applying the Graham
factors, noted that while the husband's offense was resisting arrest, which
can pose a serious risk to the officer, his behavior of yelling at the officer
and refusing to get back in the car was at best insolence.' 0 4 The dissent
reasoned that because the command to get back in the car occurred simul-
taneously with the shooting of the TASER, "[the husband's] failure to
comply cannot be deemed resistance."10 5 Further, the officer told the
husband he would be with him in a minute, and as the officer came to-
wards him the husband merely took a step in the officer's direction.10 6
The dissent insisted this was not a "dramatic threatening move" and there-
97. See id. (pointing to opposite conclusions drawn by majority and dissent in
interpreting same set of facts in most recent excessive force case, Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, (2007)).
98. 582 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2009).
99. See id. at 845 (recounting officer testimony that vehicle had crossed over
double yellow lines twice to justify pulling vehicle over).
100. See id. at 845-46 (noting that facts were in dispute as to suspect's resis-
tance to sobriety tests and whether officer touched suspect inappropriately).
101. See id. at 846 (acknowledging resistance from three of four passengers as
officers attempted to control situation).
102. See id. (indicating that TASERing occurred simultaneously with com-
mand to get back in car).
103. See id. at 851 (summarizing factors most significant to majority in its
holding that force was reasonable).
104. See id. at 859 (Shepherd,J., dissenting) ("'A reasonable officer would not
discharge his Taser simply because of insolence."' (quoting Parker v. Gerrish, 574
F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2008))).
105. See id. (stressing suspect was not given time to comply before being
TASERed).
106. See id. (submitting factors that weigh against classifying TASER use by
officer as reasonable).
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fore did not pose an immediate threat to the officer's safety."o' Lastly, the
dissent noted that there was nothing to "indicate that . . . [the husband]
was actively resisting or attempting to flee." 08 This case, like many others,
demonstrates how ambiguous the term "reasonableness" is in providing
guidance, as two reasonable groups of individuals can draw equally reason-
able and yet conflicting conclusions about the same set of facts. 09
The second source of uncertainty comes from the Supreme Court's
lack of guidance as to how to weigh the Graham factors against one an-
other and the Court's failure to limit the factors that may be relevant to
the balancing test.1 10 In addition to the Graham factors, the majority and
dissent in Cook highlighted the extent of the suspect's injury as a major
factor in whether the officer's force was excessive."'i
Some lower courts, including at least one U.S. court of appeals, have
reasoned that because the Supreme Court said that the Fourth Amend-
ment "is not capable of precise definition" it did not mean to limit the
balancing test strictly to the three factors identified in Graham.112 In addi-
tion to the Graham factors, courts have looked at: (1) whether the action
takes place in the context of affecting an arrest; (2) the possibility that the
suspect may be armed; (3) whether the officer gave a warning before using
the TASER; (4) whether more than one arrestee or officer was involved;
(5) whether the individual was restrained; (6) whether the officer applied
repeated shockings; (7) whether a warrant was used; (8) whether the
plaintiff was sober; and (9) whether other dangerous exigent circum-
stances existed at the time of the arrest."l 3
107. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (disputing majority's claim
that husband posed immediate threat to officer's safety).
108. See id. (finding in alternative that husband was generally compliant).
109. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375-92 (2007) (displaying marked
disagreement between majority and dissent as to reasonableness of defendant-of-
ficer's actions in running plaintiff off road and disagreeing as to whether plaintiff
in fact posed threat to officer or others based on video evidence).
110. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 775 (noting that "this leaves courts and law
enforcement officers with little guidance about how to determine relevance of a
particular fact or circumstance").
111. See Cook, 582 F.3d at 850-60 (noting significance of degree of injury in
excessive force claims). For a discussion of the Cook court's analysis of the Graham
factors and other factors highlighted by the majority and dissent, see supra notes
98-109 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (rea-
soning that Supreme Court did not intend to limit consideration of other factors
in reasonableness assessment under Fourth Amendment).
113. See Autin v. City of Baytown, 174 F. App'x 183, 185 (5th Cir. 2005) (find-
ing significant whether officer gave warning before using TASER, whether individ-
ual was restrained, and whether officer applied repeated shockings); Chew v.
Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (including in its reasonableness anal-
ysis: "whether a warrant was used, whether the plaintiff resisted or was armed,
whether more than one arrestee or officer was involved, whether the plaintiff was
sober, whether other dangerous exigent circumstances existed at the time of the
arrest and the nature of the arrest charges"); Shultz v. Carlisle Police Dep't, 706 F.
Supp. 2d 613, 620 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (including in its reasonableness analysis:
3812011]
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Faced with these multi-factor balancing tests, with no one factor ever
being dispositive, officers must "rely on a rigorous, fact-based analysis of
existing case law to determine the constitutionality of a course of action,"
which is completely impractical in real world situations."' 4 Officers also
struggle to determine if their conduct is reasonable when faced with con-
ditions in the field not previously addressed by the courts, or in situations
where courts are split as to a specific course of action, because officers may
have nothing to rely on to gauge their actions.15 While state regulation
would provide consistent guidance for officers, this type of regulation has
been sparse."16
C. State Regulation of TASERs: Untapped Resources
Since the TASER is not classified as a firearm, there are currently no
federal regulations or restrictions on ownership or usage."' 7 This void in
federal law leaves states free to regulate TASERs more restrictively while
remaining within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.1 18 While state
regulation would not necessarily create uniform standards across the na-
tion, it would at least create uniformity across state law enforcement agen-
cies. 119 NewJersey is currently the only state to ban TASER use by anyone,
"whether the action takes place in the context of affecting an arrest, the possibility
that the suspect may be armed and the number of persons with whom the police
officers may contend at one time" (citing Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d
Cir. 1997))).
114. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 775 (indicating difficulty faced by officers in
applying this ambiguous test). For a discussion of the impracticality of expecting
officers to apply a multi-factor balancing test prior to pursuing a course of action,
see supra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
115. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 775 (denouncing fact-specific test laid down
by Supreme Court in Graham for its lack of guidance to officers in field and its
ambiguity for courts to sort out).
116. For a discussion of the current state TASER regulations, see infra notes
117-26 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of why the TASER is not subject to federal restrictions,
see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
118. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 793 (remarking that while gap in federal
regulation would not create uniform standards, it would "allow the states to fulfill
their classic roles as laboratories for democracy to determine what works and what
does not"). "Laboratories of democracy" is the notion that states are in a unique
position to enact policies to meet their goals, which are evaluated and then
adopted by other states if the policy meets its prescribed goals. See ANDREW KARCH,
DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES. POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES 5
(2007) (noting Justice Brandeis's metaphor of states as "laboratories for democ-
racy" has been used with "great regularity" to describe unique process of trial and
error in which states adopt policies to meet their needs, other states evaluate such
policies, and then those states adopt them if they are successful or try something
different if not).
119. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 793 (observing that federal judiciary could
impart bright-line rules that would provide officers with specific guidance and cre-
ate uniform national standard, but given Supreme Court's notion that "reasonable-
ness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition," it is not
likely).
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including law enforcement. 120 Florida and Georgia are the only two states
to address TASER use by law enforcement.1 2'
The Georgia statute is broad and simply states that a TASER be "used
for law enforcement purposes in a manner consistent with established
standards and with federal and state constitutional provisions."1 22 The
Florida statute is much more specific and states that in order to use a
TASER, the circumstances
[m]ust involve an arrest or a custodial situation during which the
person who is the subject of the arrest or custody escalates resis-
tance to the officer from passive physical resistance to active phys-
ical resistance and the person: (a) has the apparent ability to
physically threaten the officer or others; or (b) is preparing or
attempting to flee or escape.' 23
Essentially, Florida requires active resistance by the subject and either (a)
the apparent ability to physically threaten an officer or others or (b) an
attempt to flee. 12 4 The Florida statute is helpful in two ways: it "ensures
proportionality between the suspect's actions and the officer's use of
force" and it is "within the bounds of what is considered reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment."' 2 5 Explicit state regulations, similar to the one
adopted in Florida, would resolve many of the inconsistencies in current
case law and provide a uniform standard for state law enforcement agen-
120. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3(h) (West 2009) ("Any person who know-
ingly has in his possession any stun gun is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.").
Nonetheless, the statute does allow for the Attorney General to designate certain
limited officers who can carry stun gun devices and those designated are exempt
from the stun gun section of the provision. See id. § 2C:39-3(g) (providing for
specific, limited exceptions to statute).
121. See FLA. STAT. § 943.1717(1) (a)-(b) (2006) (providing specific guidelines
for TASER usage by law enforcement); GA. CODE ANN., § 35-8-26 (2009) (provid-
ing broad "electronic control weapons" policy for law enforcement to abide by).
122. GA. CODE ANN., § 35-8-26. Georgia has essentially adopted the federal
standard for use-of-force. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 791 (evaluating specific state
policies enacted to regulate TASERs).
123. FLA. STAT. § 943.1717(1)(a)-(b). "This statute clearly defines the scena-
rio in which law enforcement may legally deploy stun gun technology." Spriggs,
supra note 21, at 497 (implying that other states would be better off if they adopted
policies similar to Florida's, which denotes specific regulations for TASERs rather
than grouping them in with other non-lethal weapons).
124. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 791 (indicating that statute is in line with
most courts that are almost always willing to condone officer's use of TASER when
suspect is actively resisting, while scenarios involving passive resistance are often
where inconsistencies in case law arise).
125. See id. (noting that statute effectively places TASER on level three of use-
of-force continuum, allowing usage only when suspect actively resists). For a fur-
ther discussion of the use-of-force continuum and how it guides officers' use of
force, see infra notes 130-53 and accompanying text.
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cies to apply in the field without fear of repercussions due to the uncer-
tainty of a particular course of action.1 26
IV. WHAT LEVEL OF FORCE Is APPROPRIATE?
Due to the lack of state and federal regulation, law enforcement agen-
cies have taken it upon themselves to craft their own TASER policies.12 7
Part IV.A will detail the use-of-force continuum and the role it plays in
guiding officers in appropriate uses of force depending on situational fac-
tors.1 2 8 Part IV.B will discuss international standards adopted by other
countries.129
A. Use-of-Force Continuum
The use-of-force continuum is a structure used by many law enforce-
ment agencies to establish a clearly defined set of rules to guide officers
when encountering a suspect.13 0 The structure is "based on the subject's
actions, the officer's perception of the situation and the available types of
officer responses."' 3  The use-of-force continuum serves as a visual guide
that "depicts progressive escalation and de-escalation of force based on a
subject's actions" by correlating each action by a suspect to a proportional
officer response.' 3 2
126. See Spriggs, supra note 21, at 518 (concluding that if regulations are in-
corporated into federal or state law, "law enforcement officers will be enabled to
safely and effectively deploy tasers in appropriate situations without fear of lawsuits
or disciplinary actions"). Leaving TASER regulation in its current state places both
officers and civilians at risk. See id. (specifying that "only a taser regulation that
recognizes the value of tasers but acknowledges their unique functionality will be
effective").
127. See id. at 501 (reporting that law enforcement agencies have been forced
to implement their own policies due to dearth of state and federal regulation).
128. For a discussion of the use-of-force continuum and its role in current law
enforcement TASER policies, see infra notes 130-53 and accompanying text.
129. For a discussion of international TASER standards, see infra notes 154-69
and accompanying text.
130. See GAO REPORT, supra note 28, at 7 (noting that law enforcement agen-
cies frequently refer to use-of-force models); see also Mesloh et al., supra note 23, at
24 ("Use of force can be defined as the 'exertion of power to compel or restrain
the behavior of others,' or when used in the context of policing, 'acts that threaten
or inflict physical harm on suspects."' (citation omitted)).
131. See GAO REPORT, supra note 28, at 7 (defining purpose and utility of use-
of-force policies).
132. See FED. LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., Use of Force Continuum (Podcast Transcript) [hereinafter FLETC], available at
http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/podcasts/hot-issues-pod
casts/hot-issues-transcripts/use-of-force-continuum-podcast-transcript.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2011) (describing use-of-force continuums as "mainstay" in law en-
forcement practices for many years). One commentator has noted that use-of-
force models are helpful because they legitimize, in the minds of civilians, who do
not have "training, experience or knowledge to comprehend the realities of the
street," an officer's particular use of force to see if it is consistent with an official
policy. See Dave Grossi, Setting the Record Straight on Force Continuums, POLICE MARKS-
384 [Vol. 56: p. 363
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Nevertheless, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC)-the creator of the use-of-force continuum-has made clear
that the continuum directly conflicts with Supreme Court precedent,
which states that "reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not ca-
pable of precise definition or mechanical application."' 3 3 The obvious
drawbacks of a use-of-force model are its inability to account for (1) differ-
ent circumstances, as no two encounters between an officer and a suspect
are ever exactly the same, and (2) the spur-of-the-moment decisions of-
ficer's must often make.' 3 4 While these are valid concerns, a use-of-force
continuum is meant to provide officers with guidelines, not a rigid set of
rules that must be followed in every situation. 3 5 Although the FLETC has
done away with the use-of-force continuum, many law enforcement agen-
cies still adhere to it, so it is important to understand what role it plays in
current force regulations and specifically TASER regulation.' 3 6
Many use-of-force models are based on the FLETC use-of-force con-
tinuum.' 3 7 The premise of the model is that "an officer should employ
more forceful means to control a subject only if the officer determines
that a lower level of force is inadequate."' 3 8 For example, using the
MAN, Jan./Feb. 2006, available at http://www.policeone.com/pdfs/forcecont
PMAjf2006.pdf (condoning use-of-force models, despite their abandonment by
FLETC, emphasizing their ability to convey to civilians and particularly members
of jury "reasonable progression of force" which can be applied to officers' use of
force in particular situation).
133. See generally FLETC, supra note 132 (indicating that use-of-force con-
tinuums are attempting to do what Supreme Court has said is impossible to do by
creating mechanical application of reasonableness under Fourth Amendment).
Another problem with use-of-force models are the generic terms such as "passive
resistance" or "active resistance" that are used, because there is no universal agree-
ment as to how each of these terms should be defined. See id. (explaining that
actions viewed as passive resistance by one officer may appear to be active resis-
tance to another, which "may cause an officer to unnecessarily hesitate").
134. See id. (emphasizing that it is impossible for model to account for factors
such as "known violent history of the suspect; duration of the action; size; age;
condition of the officer and suspect; and other facts that may make up the totality
of circumstances").
135. See GAO REPORT, supra note 28, at 7 (indicating that use-of-force policies
provide guidance to officers, not rigid set of rules).
136. See id. at 9 (reporting that all seven agencies contacted for survey used
some form of use-of-force policy). The International Association of Chiefs of Po-
lice developed a nine-step strategy designed to guide law enforcement in its use
and implementation of TASERs and encouraging agencies to adopt similarly struc-
tured policies to guide their officers. See IACP REPORT, supra note 27, at 5 (stating
belief that as more agencies continue to implement TASER technology "they can
be aided by a structured process for decision-making and deployment").
137. See GAO REPORT, supra note 28, at 7-8 (noting that FLETC use-of-force
continuum includes five levels of "potential subject actions and corresponding of-
ficer responses," with subject actions ranging from compliant to assaultive and of-
ficer responses ranging from cooperative controls to deadly force).
138. See id. at 8 (stating that officers are generally encouraged to employ
minimum amount of force necessary under the circumstances" when responding
to suspect's actions).
2011] 385
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FLETC's use-of-force continuum, if a suspect is compliant with an officer's
orders, the officer should respond with "cooperative controls," such as ver-
bal commands to control the suspect.' 39 Likewise, if an officer perceives a
suspect to be passively resisting, the model provides for "compliance tech-
niques," which include techniques such as pressure points and joint
locks.140
In a study conducted by the Government Accountability Office of
seven law enforcement agencies that distributed and used TASERs in their
daily practices, all seven reported that they trained their officers using
some form of a use-of-force model.141 Further, all of the agencies con-
firmed that "they rely on the continuum to help provide officers with gui-
dance in carrying out their law enforcement responsibilities."1 42
Nevertheless, none of the agencies had a separate use-of-force policy that
specifically addressed TASERs.1 43 Rather, each had incorporated the
TASER into its existing use-of-force policy. 144 In addition to lacking spe-
cific TASER regulations, the policies varied based on where the TASER
was placed on each agency's use-of-force continuum.145 One law enforce-
ment agency in Orange County, Florida permits the use of a TASER when
a suspect is merely passively resisting arrest.' 4 6 Only two of the seven
agencies placed the TASER on the same level as impact weapons like ba-
tons, which can only be used when the "officer perceives the situation as
139. See id. (explaining operation of use-of-force continuum).
140. See I.R.S. Manual § 9.2.3.3.1 (defining four categories of weaponless con-
trol: cooperative controls, contact controls, compliance techniques, and defensive
tactics).
141. See GAO REPORT, supra note 28, at 7 (commenting that though none of
agencies had separate use-of-force policies tailored to TASERs, all had general use-
of-force policies to provide officers with "guidance on the circumstances in which
the use of Tasers may be appropriate").
142. Id. at 8 (reporting that each of seven agencies had incorporated TASERs
as another aspect of training in their use-of-force policies).
143. See id. at 7 (explaining how each agency had incorporated TASERs into
existing use-of-force policies consisting of mace, pepper spray, batons, firearms,
etc.).
144. See id. at 9 (documenting where each agency had placed TASER on its
use-of-force model). Grouping TASERs in with other non-lethal weapons, like
pepper spray, leaves TASERs in a "legal grey zone, where much of the regulation is
settled in case law rather than state legislation." See Spriggs, supra note 21, at 497
(indicating a "disparity in the utility and effect of the various non-lethal weapons"
when grouping them all together rather than regulating their specific uses and
effects).
145. See GAO REPORT, supra note 28, at 9 (reporting that four of seven agen-
cies placed TASER on same level as mace and pepper spray, allowing officers to
use TASER if suspect is actively resisting arrest but not attacking officer).
146. See id. (explaining that by allowing passively resisting individuals to be
TASERed, agency warrants TASERing suspect merely for failing to respond to ver-
bal commands of officer).
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potentially harmful, as when a subject engages in assaultive behavior that
creates a risk of physical injury to another."147
Incorporating TASERs into current use-of-force policies creates two
problems.148 The first problem is that the great variation across law en-
forcement agencies as to where the TASER is placed on their use-of-force
continuum requires courts to assess each individual policy when deciding
whether an officer behaved reasonably.14 9 This leads to confusion and
inconsistent results; in many instances, courts have held an officer's use of
force unreasonable even when the officer acted in accordance with law
enforcement TASER policy.15 0 The second problem is that when TASERs
are incorporated into existing policies they have been placed far too low
on the use-of-force scale, resulting in very little training. 5 1 Of the seven
147. See id. (explaining that "instances in which a suspect attacks or threatens
to attack an officer by fighting or kicking" would be examples of behaviors that
would warrant TASER usage by officers). Many courts are in agreement that as-
saultive behavior almost always merits use of the TASER, and that officers act rea-
sonably by resorting to TASERing if faced with such behavior. See Fabian, supra
note 23, at 783 (attempting to reconcile holdings of lower courts applying multi-
factor balancing test by separating results into situations where individuals were
passively resisting or actively resisting arrest).
148. For a discussion of why it is not advisable to include the TASER in cur-
rent use-of-force policies, see infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Neal-Lomax v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 574 F. Supp. 2d
1170, 1184 (D. Nev. 2008) (reasoning that while police departments' "policies or
training materials are not dispositive on the constitutional level of reasonable
force, courts may consider a police department's own guidelines when evaluating
whether a particular use of force is constitutionally unreasonable"), aff'd, 371 Fed.
App'x 752 (9th Cir. 2010), The court in Neal-Lomax upheld an officer's use of a
TASER seven times on a suspect actively resisting while under the influence of
PCP, noting that the officer's actions were consistent with his training, he had
warned the suspect each time before TASERing him, and each time the officer
applied the TASER it resulted in momentary compliance. See id. at 1185-86 (find-
ing that reasonable officer in these circumstances could have believed his conduct
was appropriate).
150. See Moretta v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 06-CIV-20467, 2007 WL 701009, at
*8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2007) (holding that officer could not rely on law enforcement
policy to claim force was constitutional where reasonable officer would know that
given totality of circumstances his actions were "excessive or in violation of individ-
ual constitutional rights, even if those actions were consistent with the policy"),
affd, 280 Fed. App'x 823 (11th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, many courts are in agree-
ment that written policies guiding police action when deploying TASERs is prefer-
able. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(remarking that "[g]iven the substantial pain inflicted by the taser, and the still
uncertain health risks, ... clear written policy on use of the taser is critical, particu-
larly since the taser itself can not be pre-programmed to regulate or register the
length of the charge" (citation omitted)).
151. See Amnesty Int'l, USA: Amnesty International's Continuing Concern About
Taser Use, at 19, AI Index AMR 51/030/2008 (Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://
www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/AI-taser-rpt20061.pdf (condemning U.S. police depart-
ments for continuing to place TASERs too low on their use-of-force models, thus
allowing for TASER use in situations where deadly force would never be war-
ranted). "The Taser continues to be used as a routine force tool, not as a last
resort where the only other option would be use of a conventional firearm." Id.
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agencies observed, the report noted that only four to eight hours of train-
ing were required for an officer to carry a TASER as compared to sixty to
100 hours required for a firearm.16 2 This lack of proper officer training as
to when TASER use is appropriate has been criticized by international
groups that urge banning or strictly limiting TASERs.15 s
B. International Standards: Are TASERs a Form of Torture?
Amnesty International has urged that all TASER usage stop until ex-
perienced medical personnel conduct independent studies regarding the
true health effects of TASERs on the human body.154 It also argues that
use-of-force training should be tailored to international standards on
human rights.1 5 5 As one civil rights group has noted, "while the Taser is
less deadly than a traditional firearm, it is hardly the non-lethal weapon its
manufacturer promotes."1 5 6 The rising number of TASER-related fatali-
152. See GAO REPORT, supra note 28, at 11-12 (reporting that such testing
stresses "how to (1) properly handle the weapon, (2) locate the shot, (3) safeguard
the Taser, (4) conduct proper function tests, (5) overcome system malfunctions in
a timely fashion, and (6) perform post-Taser deployment actions"). The ACLU
has raised concerns that the limited training required of officers in many jurisdic-
tions is based almost exclusively on TASER International materials, which are often
outdated and overstate the safety of the TASER. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 14,
at 8 (indicating that reliance on these materials gives officers "a false impression of
the risks of using Tasers on potential suspects" by encouraging "multiple uses of
the weapon, downplay[ing] the risks of using Tasers on people under the influ-
ence of drugs, and misrepresent[ing] the few medical reviews that have been done
on Tasers").
153. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 67-68 (recommending suspension
of all transfers and use of TASERs until independent medical studies are under-
taken to learn true health effects of being shocked by TASER and urging those
using TASERs to strictly limit them to situations where only other alternative is
deadly force); see also ACLU REPORT, supra note 14, at 16 (recommending TASERs
"only be used in life-threatening situations," which "may save lives while avoiding
unnecessary deaths caused by Tasers," until independent testing of TASER safety
has been completed).
154. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 67-68 (specifying that independent
studies require "medical, scientific, legal and law enforcement experts who are
independent of commercial and political interests in promoting such equipment"
and who would be more likely to assess TASER usage in light of international
human rights standards rather than studies performed by TASER International
and its affiliates, who have clearly biased interest in law enforcement purchasing
their product).
155. See id. at 2 (noting that many agencies are "deploying tasers as a routine
force option to subdue non-compliant or disturbed individuals who do not pose a
serious danger to themselves or others," which in many instances violates interna-
tional standards that "require that force should be used as a last resort and that
officers must apply only the minimum amount of force necessary to obtain a lawful
objective").
156. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 14, at 1 (taking issue with TASER Interna-
tional's continued promotion of TASERs as "Saving Lives Every Day" (quoting
TASER International homepage)). The ACLU contends that TASER Interna-
tional's marketing practices are misleading because they encourage TASER usage
in a broad range of circumstances when it is clear that "Tasers are used in situa-
388 [Vol. 56: p. 363
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss2/5
THE SHOCKING TRUTH
ties only serves to reinforce this claim.1 5 7 While many doctors are hesitant
to attribute fatalities to being struck with a TASER, because there has been
little independent study as to its effects on the body, one doctor has spo-
ken out against the TASER by describing its effects as essentially playing
Russian Roulette with the heart:15 8
While the shock alone does not cause injury or death in most
cases, it may be fatal if it hits the subject during the vulnerable
period of the heart beat cycle, is used on particularly susceptible
populations [people with heart problems or under the influence
of drugs], or is used multiple times and for an extended time
period.15 9
This misinformation about TASER safety is due in large part to law
enforcement's reliance on materials provided by TASER International
(the manufacturer) that overstate TASER safety and understate its risks.' 6 0
tions in which officers would never-and could never legally-use a gun." See id.
at 6 (reporting that TASER International does not limit its promotion of TASERs
to situations where officers face "possible imminent death or grave bodily injury,"
when firearms would be allowed, but rather also promotes TASERs in "far less
threatening situations ranging from the resistance or flight of unarmed suspects to
verbal displays of hostility and non-compliance").
157. For a discussion of TASER-related fatalities and injuries, see infra notes
19-21 and accompanying text.
158. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 14, at 4 (explaining that multiple applica-
tions of TASER "increases the chance that the electrical charge will hit the heart in
a vulnerable period" and comparing repeated TASER shockings to Russian Rou-
lette because it is dangerous, and, "[a]t some point, you may hit that vulnerable
period" (quoting Matthias Gafni, Autopsy Reveals Taser Use, VALLEJO TIMES HERALD,
Jan. 6, 2005)).
159. See id. (indicating that "if the Taser sends its energy to the heart at the
wrong time, the electricity may cause ventricular fibrillation, a state in which the
heart muscles spasm uncontrollably, disrupting the hearts [sic] pumping function
and causing death" (citing Russel Sabin, Heart Expert Warns About Using Tasers, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 5, 2005, at Bl)). The ACLU has noted that children
are a particularly susceptible and vulnerable population "because the same
amount of current is injected by the device, whatever the size of the person." Id.
Thus, in a smaller person, the amount that is flowing into one space is much
greater and therefore "any sort of damage that occurs will be greater." Id. (quot-
ing Roger Barr, Talk of the Nation, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Dec. 7, 2004)).
160. See id. at 10 (specifying one particular misrepresentation in Version 12 of
TASER International's training materials, which states that TASER International
"presents the 'independent conclusions' of studies that are actually not indepen-
dent or are taken out of context"). Another study heavily relied upon by TASER
International training materials was done by the U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD), which concluded that "'Electro-Muscular Incapacitation (TASER) is likely
not the primary causative factor in reported fatalities.'" Id. (quoting TASER Int'l,
Taser X26 and Taser M26 Non-Lethal Weapons, Instructor Certification Course,
Nov. 2004, at slide 172). That study, however, failed to disclose that TASER Inter-
national officials, according to newspaper reports, "'not only participated in three
panels to determine the scope of the study, analyze data and review findings, but
also provided the bulk of research used in the study."' See id. (citation omitted)
(noting that DOD study even recognized that its findings were based on potentially
inherent sources of bias).
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Even the United States Department of Defense has come out and said that
the records on which TASER International relied in drawing its conclu-
sions about TASER safety "are not a statistically representative sample and
are potentially influenced by a number of sources of bias."' 61
While TASER usage does not often lead to fatalities, its force should
not be taken lightly. 162 One officer who was shot with a TASER said, "[i]t
is the most pain I ever felt in my life... . I felt like my muscles were going
to explode."163 Another officer, who only received a one-and-a-half-sec-
ond shock-as opposed to the normal five-second shock applied to sus-
pects-compared the TASER shock to sticking a finger in a light socket
over and over. 164
It is reactions such as these that have led some law enforcement agen-
cies to ban this "less than lethal" technology.16 5 It is also the reason Am-
nesty International claims that United States law enforcement agencies are
161. See THE JOINT NON-LETHAL HUMAN EFFECTS CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, U.S.
DEP'T OF DEF., HUMAN EFFECTIVENESS AND RISK CHARACTERIZATION OF ELECTROMUS-
CULAR INCAPACITATION DEVICE-A LIMITED ANALYSIS OF THE TASER 71 (2004),
available at http://www.theiacp.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=nhks8yxUZ3k%3d&
tabid=301 (admitting that its findings should be viewed with caution because analy-
sis relied on significant amount of data from TASER International, which had
taken steps to procure certain reported testimony by offering free cartridges to
police departments in exchange for reports).
162. For a discussion of why TASER usage should not be taken lightly, see
infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
163. See John Monk, Troopers Hurt in Taser Training, THE HERALD, Sept. 19,
2010, at BI (reporting that three officers out of three hundred being trained had
been injured during TASER training, which exceeds TASER International's "own
estimates of how frequently law enforcement officers are hurt nationally during
training"). These injuries occurred despite TASER International's precautionary
measures during officers' TASER training in which they are TASERed under
"highly controlled circumstances. They aren't fighting back and they are supposed
to be held so they won't fall and hurt themselves." Id. These results are puzzling
because TASER International touts that 99.7% of 1,201 subjects in a medical study
had no injuries or mild injuries, under circumstances which are not as highly con-
trolled and more likely to produce injury. See William P. Bozeman et al., Safety and
Injury Profile of Conducted Electrical Weapons Used by Law Enforcement Officers Against
Criminal Suspects, 53 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 480 (2009), available at http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19157651?dopt=citation (discussing results of
study based on case studies of all TASER uses against criminal suspects in six
United States law enforcement agencies).
164. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 5 (compiling officer testimony of pain
felt in response to "a fraction of the normal taser discharge" they have been sub-
jected to at training seminars). A firearms consultant confirmed that "it is the
most profound pain I have ever felt." Id. at 6. These reports tend to support Am-
nesty International's assertions that TASER usage is cruel, inhumane, degrading,
and falls outside the bounds of appropriate conduct.
165. See, e.g., ACLU REPORT, supra note 14, at 5, (quoting Newark Police De-
partment Chief Ray Samuels who stated that his reservations about TASERs are
that they can be deployed "absolutely within the manufacturer's recommendation
and there is still the possibility of unintended reaction. I can't imagine a worse
circumstance than to have a death attributed to a Taser in a situation that didn't
justify lethal force. It's not a risk I'm willing to take.").
390 [Vol. 56: p. 363
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss2/5
THE SHOCKING TRUTH
in violation of international law, which states that "[n]o law enforcement
official may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . . .e166 Other interna-
tional communities have taken heed to these warnings of abuse and
strictly tailored their TASER policies.16 7 The United Kingdom, for in-
stance, only allows TASERs to be used by authorized firearms officers, and
the TASERs are placed in a firearms box and issued only in appropriate
situations in which an officer faces a threat of deadly force.1 6 8 This stan-
dard better accounts for the health risks and civil rights implications of
using TASERs. 169
V. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
A. Recommendations for Safer TASER Outcomes
Muddled case law, inconsistent police policies, and lack of state regu-
lation has led to a conflicting and misleading understanding of appropri-
ate TASER usage.170 A clear and unambiguous standard is needed to
guide both law enforcement and courts in the reasonable use and assess-
ment of the TASER. 171 The first problem that needs to be addressed in
TASER regulation is the idea that law enforcement can regulate itself.172
As one scholar has noted, police cannot be trusted to regulate themselves;
self-regulation has proven ineffective time and time again.17 3
The federal government is in the best position to create a uniform
national policy to regulate TASERs, but so far it has largely deferred to the
166. See G.A. Res. 34/169, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979)
(defining permissible conduct of law enforcement based on international civil
rights standards).
167. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 8 (comparing United Kingdom
procedures for using TASER only when officers are faced with deadly force with
U.S. standards, which permit "use in much broader circumstances").
168. See id. at 8 (favoring United Kingdom's more narrowly tailored TASER
policy).
169. See id. at 10-11 (reporting that "improved policies, training and oversight
have been shown to be critical factors in reducing police shootings and injuries to
suspects or officers").
170. For a list of suggested recommendations on how to remedy the inconsis-
tencies in case law and law enforcement regulations, see infra notes 170-97 and
accompanying text.
171. See Spriggs, supra note 21, at 511-12 (acknowledging certain ACLU and
Amnesty International recommendations to limit TASER use to only situations in
which officers would be authorized to use lethal force as well as stronger regula-
tions against TASERing vulnerable individuals).
172. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1079 (finding Supreme Court's premise
that law enforcement can regulate itself as unfounded because law enforcement
cannot be expected to "discipline officers for constitutional violations that officials
know nothing about").
173. See id. at 1078-79 (concluding that qualified immunity is not as necessary
as Supreme Court has urged, because threat of lawsuit has often made very little
difference in law enforcement agency procedures).
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states to fill this void.17 4 States are in a unique position to create specific
minimum standards for TASER use upon which both officers and civilians
can rely.'75 Florida's statute provides a useful example of this type of reg-
ulation because it clearly identifies when a TASER is appropriate and what
level of resistance by a suspect is required in order to use a TASER.176
These statutes should also set a specific number of times an individual can
be shocked with a TASER to avoid the Russian Roulette effect described
above.' 7 7 Even TASER International has admitted that multiple shocks
"may impair breathing and respiration."17 8 In an ACLU study of fifty-four
agencies in California, only four had any policy that warned against or
prohibited multiple shocks. '7  This is a serious problem because many of
the fatalities associated with TASER use have involved repeated shock-
ings. 8 0 In addition, an effective statute would include some warning or
prohibition against TASERing vulnerable individuals-those at the ex-
tremes of age (youth or elderly), along with pregnant individuals. 18 '
Another scholar has noted that courts could alleviate some of the con-
fusion surrounding TASER regulation by strictly enforcing the three-
prong Graham test set down by the Supreme Court.'8 2 Many courts have
deemed TASER usage reasonable even where a suspect was not actively
resisting or posing a threat to officers, which are elements the Graham test
174. See GAO REPORT, supra note 28, at 17 (indicating that federal govern-
ment has regulated only in regards to Army usage of TASERs and that Transporta-
tion Security Administration also has authority to carry TASERs).
175. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 14, at 15 (urging that states create some
"baseline standards on the use of Tasers" or at very least "take steps to minimize
the risk of death and serious injury from Taser use"). For example, states have
established such standards by "regulating the number of shocks that can be admin-
istered on an individual, the use of Tasers on juveniles, the elderly, pregnant wo-
men, and people known to be under the influence of drugs, the use of tasers on
handcuffed and unconscious individuals, and on passive resisters". Id.
176. See FLA. STAT. § 943.1717(1) (a)-(b) (2006) (providing specific TASER
deployment guidelines for law enforcement).
177. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 14, at 12 (finding that vast majority of po-
lice departments in California had no limitation on number of times individuals
can be shocked).
178. See id. (quoting TASER IrNr'L, Training Bulletin 12.0-04, June 28, 2005).
179. See id. (indicating need for regulation as dearth of policies exists).
180. See, e.g., id. at 3 (reporting on death of twenty-one-year-old Andrew Wash-
ington after .being shot with TASER seventeen times in span of only three
minutes).
181. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 32 (indicating that Portland, Ore-
gon police amended their TASER policies after paying out large settlement to re-
strict TASER usage on elderly, children, and pregnant women).
182. See Spriggs, supra note 21, at 500 (analyzing Graham factors and noting
that if courts applied test strictly it is unlikely that shocking vulnerable individual
(youth, elderly, visibly pregnant) would be deemed reasonable because they likely
would not cause any true threat of danger to officer).
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requires if strictly applied.1 8 3 In other words, a restrained individual
would not be a threat to officers, and therefore TASER usage would not be
warranted. 184
Furthermore, proportionality is an important factor that must be con-
sidered when crafting laws and policies that govern TASER use by law en-
forcement officials.' 8 5 Excessive force lawsuits are brought specifically
because victims do not believe that the use of force against them was pro-
portional or necessary-they believe it was excessive.18 6 One factor that
courts often consider when deciding if an officer's use of force was reason-
able is whether a warning was given.' 8 7 A warning to suspects should be
mandatory before firing a TASER whenever it is possible, and so long as it
would not be futile, in order to give a suspect the opportunity to stop
resisting and follow orders.' 8 8
Lastly, a vital recommendation called for by Amnesty International,
and seconded by many law enforcement agencies, is independent medical
testing of TASERs.1 89 These tests are necessary to learn the true health
implications a TASER has on the body, specifically when used against indi-
viduals with heart problems or under the influence of drugs.' 9 0 As many
of the studies in this Note have cautioned, much of the available statistical
data on TASER safety was created by TASER International, which has a
vested interest in selling its product, and therefore, may be biased in the
data it presents.' 9 '
183. See, e.g., Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App'x 791 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding
officer's TASERing of individual reasonable despite fact that he was arguably not
threat to officer and was not actively resisting).
184. See Spriggs, supra note 21, at 500 (explaining that restrained individual
would "likely pose less of a threat to the officer or others, thus affecting the three
factor balance").
185. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 792-93 (reasoning that "[w]hen officers use
force that is disproportionate to the threat, it can spark fear, anger, and even pro-
tests that degrade law enforcement's relationship with the community").
186. See id. at 793 (finding that "[i]t runs contrary to many people's expecta-
tions about what constitutes reasonable force to allow officers to Taser passively-
resisting suspects who pose no threat to the officer or others").
187. See Autin v. City of Baytown, 174 F. App'x 183, 185 (5th Cir. 2005) (em-
phasizing that officer TASERed suspect when her back was to him and without
giving her proper warning).
188. See Sam W. Wu, Case Summary, "When Can I Tase Him, Bro?": Bryan v.
McPherson and the Propiety of Police Use of Tasers, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 361,
375 (2010) (noting that lack of warning by officer when he had ample time to do
so was determinative factor in Ninth Circuit finding that officer's TASERing was
unreasonable).
189. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 5, at 67-68 (urging further investigation of
health effects of TASER usage and halting of all TASER usage until then).
190. See id. (presuming fatalities related to TASERing drug-induced and men-
tally ill persons are more than coincidence and must be investigated).
191. See, e.g., ACLU REPORT, supra note 14, at 10 (noting DOD's disclaimer
that much of data relied on by TASER International had potential for bias).
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B. Conclusion
The growing number of fatalities associated with TASER usage as
more law enforcement agencies implement them cannot be a mere coinci-
dence.1 92 Law enforcement has often been overzealous in its use of the
TASER in situations in which a TASER has clearly not been warranted.19 3
Whether this was due to ignorance or just plain confusion as to the appro-
priate circumstances for employing a TASER, law enforcement cannot be
expected to know in every instance when a TASER is appropriate without
some clear, unambiguous guidance from either courts, states, or the fed-
eral government.' 9 4 Ideally, a bright-line rule from the Supreme Court
could create a clear, uniform national standard that would guide both of-
ficers and courts.195 This result is unlikely to be forthcoming, however,
because the Court has stated that "'reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment is not capable of precise definition."" 9 6 If the federal gov-
ernment is going to continue to defer to the states on this issue, then the
states are in a unique position to fill the void in TASER regulation and
alleviate the confusion as to when TASERs are warranted.19 7
192. For a discussion on TASER-related fatalities and opposing viewpoints
taken by civil rights groups and TASER International as to the cause of such fatali-
ties, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., ACLU REPORT, supra note 14, at 3 (reporting that officers
TASERed suspect seventeen times in span of only three minutes).
194. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1079 (supposing law enforcement is not in
position to regulate itself when constitutional interpretations by courts are ambigu-
ous and inconsistent).
195. See Fabian, supra note 23, at 793 (indicating that while bright-line rule
from Supreme Court would be best solution to combat current inconsistencies in
case law arising from Graham, it is unlikely Supreme Court will lay down such
standard).
196. Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)) (concluding
bright-line rule is not forthcoming).
197. See id. (stating that federal law does not currently restrict TASER usage so
states are in position to adopt "more restrictive standards while still staying within
the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment").
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